Authors:
João P. Hespanha,
Maria Prandini,
Shankar Sastry,
Volume: 1, Page 2272 Paper number 1810
Abstract:
This paper addresses the control of a team of autonomous agents pursuing
a smart evader in a non-accurately mapped terrain. By describing the
problem as a partial information Markov game, we are able to integrate
map-learning and pursuit. We propose receding horizon control policies,
in which the pursuers and the evader try to respectively maximize and
minimize the probability of capture at the next time instant. Because
this probability is conditioned to distinct observations for each team,
the resulting game is nonzero-sum. When the evader has access to the
pursuers' information, we show that a Nash solution to the one-step
nonzero-sum game always exists. Moreover, we propose a method to compute
the Nash equilibrium policies by solving an equivalent zero-sum matrix
game. A simulation example shows the feasibility of the proposed approach.
Authors:
D. Leão,
João B.R. do Val,
Marcelo D. Fragoso,
Volume: 1, Page 2278 Paper number 1937
Abstract:
We study in this paper a discrete-time, two-players, zero-sum stochastic
dynamic game similar to that introduced by Schal (1981). The novelty
here, regarding previous works, is that besides the fact that the players
do not have access to the opponent's earlier choices, they do not have
all information about the state of the game. The main results are a
minimax theorem and the existence of optimal strategy for one player.
Authors:
Xi-Ren Cao,
Hong-Xia Shen,
Volume: 1, Page 2284 Paper number 1397
Abstract:
The central issue of Internet economics is pricing. In [1], we studied
the Internet pricing based on the leader-follower game, the cooperative
game, and the two-person game theory. In this paper, we continue our
study by comparing different pricing schemes with the above approaches.
These schemes include Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) and pricing with priority.
We show that PMP does not provide better social welfare thus does not
provide better cooperative solutions. Numerical examples indicate that
the leader-follower game leads to an optimal solution with the same
price for both "classes" of users in PMP. This contradicts to the intention
of the original design of the scheme.
Authors:
Piyush Gupta,
Panganamala R. Kumar,
Volume: 1, Page 2290 Paper number 1739
Abstract:
Consider n nodes located in a sphere of volume V cubic meters, each
capable of transmitting at a rate of W bits/sec. Under a protocol based
model for successful receptions, the entire network can carry only
(Theta)(W V^1/3 n^2/3) bit-meters/sec, where 1 bit carried a distance
of 1 meter is counted as 1 bit-meter. This is the best possible even
assuming the node locations, traffic patterns, and the range/power/timing
of each transmission, are all optimally chosen. If the node locations
and their destinations are randomly chosen, and all transmissions employ
the same power/range, then each node only obtains a throughput of (Theta)(W
/(n^1/3 (log n)^2/3)) bits/sec, if the network is optimally operated.
Similar results hold under an alternate physical model where a minimum
signal-to-interference ratio is specified for successful receptions.
The proofs of these results require determination of the VC-dimensions
of certain geometric sets, which may be of independent interest.
Authors:
Stephen D. Patek,
Enrique Campos-Náñez,
Volume: 1, Page 2296 Paper number 1309
Abstract:
Recent research on dynamic pricing of multiclass loss networks has
shown that the performance of optimal static pricing approaches that
of optimal dynamic (congestion-dependent) pricing in the many small
sources limit. In our own work with similar models, we have found it
difficult to obtain large gains over static pricing in realistic settings,
even when the many small sources assumption is violated. In this paper
we give an example which is a stochastic control model for congestion-dependent
pricing of Internet services. Our formulation captures the basic tradeoff
in allocating bandwidth to two classes of users in maximizing average
net revenue. Optimal pricing requires that the ISP anticipate and respond
to changes in bandwidth consumption. Our goal is to quantify the gain
that can be achieved through dynamic pricing over open loop pricing
strategies which may or may not account for time-of-day effects. We
frame the problem as a continuous-time Markov decision process for
which we numerically compute optimal solutions.
Authors:
Christopher G. Lott,
Demosthenis Teneketzis,
Volume: 1, Page 2302 Paper number 1303
Abstract:
We investigate a network routing problem where a probabilistic local
broadcast model for wireless transmission is used. We present results
showing that an index policy is optimal for this problem. We extend
the original model to allow for power control, and assert that the
index nature of the optimal routing policy remains unchanged. We further
allow time-varying system parameters in the original model, and discover
conditions under which a time-varying index routing policy is optimal.
Finally, we present a distributed implementation of the routing policy
and provide results on its convergence properties.
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